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The articles in this issue of the Journal expresses the
underlying tension between the forms of electronic
signature that people use in their daily lives, and the early
attempts to introduce the widespread use of cryptography
in the form of digital signatures as a standard form of
electronic signature. When using technology, people prefer
something that is both easy to use and straightforward to
understand. This is why, when it comes to the form an
electronic signature can take, the three most popular types
of electronic signature in use are:
n Typing a name into a document, such as an e-mail.
n Using a password or a personal identification number
(PIN).
n Clicking the ‘I accept’ icon to accept the terms of a
software licence or to agree to enter a contract on-line.
These forms of electronic signature are popular because
of their attributes and simplicity of use. For instance, the
act of typing a name into a document in electronic format
replicates the meaning of a manuscript signature. Of
course, the typed version of a name is clearly not capable
of replicating the unique manifestation of a manuscript
signature. However, the act of typing a name into a
document, or the inclusion of the name in an automatic
signature block at the end of an e-mail, acts as a symbolic
link to the physical world. A person’s name is capable of
representing their unique identity. As a result, the use of a
name typed into a document in electronic format is
capable of serving a number of purposes, one of which is
to identify the sender of the communication, another of
which is to indicate the sender adopts the content.
However, there is a perceived problem with the use of
the three types of electronic signature set out above. That
is, it cannot be certain that the person whose name is
typed in the e-mail, the password or the PIN number used,
or the icon that is clicked, is that of the person that it
claims to represent. In this respect, the claim made for
digital signatures is that the use of a signature based on
cryptography provides a greater assurance in providing the
link between the owner of the digital signature and the
use of the signature. Politicians across the world have
accepted this assertion, and have passed laws to this
effect, including legal presumptions regarding the use of
digital signatures in particular. To give one example, the
provisions of article 7 of the Ley De Firma Digital Nº 25.506
of Argentina sets out a presumption that where a digital
signature is used, it belongs to the holder of the certificate:
“ARTICULO 7º. – Presunción de autoría. Se presume,
salvo prueba en contrario, que toda firma digital
pertenece al titular del certificado digital que permite la
verificación de dicha firma.”
“ARTICLE 7. – Authorship presumption. Unless it is
otherwise proved, every digital signature is presumed to
belong to the holder of the digital certificate that
permits the verification of the digital signature in
question.”
The presumption is further enhanced by the provisions
of article 10. This provides that where a person uses a
digital signature, they will be presumed to have sent it,
even where it is sent automatically:
“ARTICULO 10. – Remitente. Presunción. Cuando un
documento digital sea enviado en forma automática por
un dispositivo programado y lleve la firma digital del
remitente se presumirá, salvo prueba en contrario, que
el documento firmado proviene del remitente.”
“ARTICLE 10. – Sender presumption. When a digital
document is sent automatically by a programmed device
and bears the sender’s digital signature it shall be
presumed, unless otherwise specified, that the signed
document was originated by the sender.”
Unfortunately, both the technology and the
infrastructure supporting digital signatures is opaque and
difficult to understand. The vast majority of people fail to
appreciate the need to secure their computers from
hackers and other threats, as the number of zombie
computers used by hackers testifies. This means a digital
signature can be used by a malicious person, either by
obtaining remote access to a computer, or where the
computer is used by a person other than the owner of the
digital certificate. Naturally, the other forms of electronic
signatures set out above are just as capable of being
misused in the same way.
As a result, the recipient of an electronic communication
or document must determine for themselves whether they
trust the source of the communication. It is for this reason
that a name typed into an e-mail is easier to deal with.
People are beginning to become more familiar with the
features to look out for when an e-mail is received that
does not appear to be genuine. Even if a person is not
aware of the header information that is available to test
the source of the e-mail (although this may be forged),
there are a number of features that a recipient can assess,
including the authenticity of the sender’s e-mail address,
the linguistic structure of the text of the e-mail, and
whether there are references to physical attributes, such as
a postal address or a telephone number. It is inevitable that
new users of the networked world will make mistakes,
such as responding to phishing attacks. However, a
combination of intuition and education will help resolve,
although not eradicate, reliance on forged or unwanted
electronic communications. Digital signatures do have a
part to play, but within the context of a closed system, by
which all the parties are contractually bound to provide for
the security of their systems, thus reducing the risks that an
electronic signature can be used without authority or
inappropriately.
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The digital environment has caused us to more fully
comprehend the complexities of the assumptions we take
for granted in the physical world.
One example is buying goods and services over the
internet. Previously, buying at a distance was mainly by
mail order catalogue, a means of selling that began in the
nineteenth century. Catalogues are not immune from
schemes to defraud buyers. However, because it takes
time, trouble and expense to display merchandise in a
catalogue, the buyer feels a degree of reassurance that 
the catalogue is trustworthy because it is a physical object,
which in turn provides a high level of comfort. The
catalogue confirms the existence of the supplier, and 
acts to reassure the buyer that the goods they order will 
be supplied.
The physical item of a catalogue should not, necessarily,
act to reassure the buyer. The catalogue could be an
elaborate swindle to defraud buyers by purporting to offer
goods, and once sufficient money has been cashed, the
thieves disappear without supplying the goods ordered. To
be worthwhile, the cost of setting up the deception has to
be low enough to provide an adequate return.
Attempts to defraud mail order catalogues are relatively
rare, because the set-up costs are disproportionate to the
return. The reverse applies in the digital world. The outlay
in setting up a similar operation in the digital domain is
minimal, and the returns can be significant. Mass
education has helped budding crooks, because schools
across the world not only teach children how to read and
write, but they provide sufficient knowledge about
computers to encourage the fraudsters whilst young.
However, the majority of children receive such a
rudimentary understanding of the digital world, that they
fail to understand the risks when participating in the 
digital world.
Until the emergence of the digital environment, we
relied on our perceptions, based on experience, about the
physical materials we handled in everyday life. A person
will trust a physical object by considering its intrinsic
properties. Items that are not trustworthy may be manifest
because a letterhead does not quite look genuine, or a
manuscript signature on a cheque differs a little too much
from that which is usually observed. In essence, we all
authenticate the provenance of physical objects every day:
just as we are learning to verify our perceptions in the
digital world.
In responding to the risks associated with the digital
realm, attempts have been made to provide sufficient
assurance that the person we are dealing with is the
person we should be dealing with. This is often described
incorrectly as ‘security’ by people at the end of a telephone
in a call centre. Authenticating the identity of the other
party certainly forms part of the security process, but in
itself, the aim of authentication is to validate the person’s
identity: it is necessary to exchange sufficient information
to reassure one or both parties that the person they are
communicating with is the person whom they claim to be.
For this purpose, government agencies and banks in
particular have taken great strides to resolve this problem.
In responding to this quandary, the digital world has
moved us away from dependence on a signature, to
reliance on the use of multiple items of information that,
taken together, validate the identity of the user to an
acceptable degree of trustworthiness.
Of future interest will be how human beings cope with
the demands to retain passwords and PIN numbers in their
memory. A person has little difficulty in replicating their
manuscript signature, but may have significant problems in
recalling passwords and PIN numbers to obtain access to
their bank account and other services. To this end, it will be
significant to know what work has been undertaken in the
medical profession on memory. For instance, consider the
liability of a bank that insists a person must use a PIN
number to obtain access to their bank account. The
question might be, what is the likelihood that the bank is
liable for failing to deliver up the customer’s property, even
though the customer cannot remember their PIN number,
yet they are perfectly capable of signing their name.
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